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The objective of this study was to evaluate the intended and unintended impact on 
pharmaceutical use and sales of three public financing reforms applied to the 
prescription of statins: a Spanish generic reference pricing (RP) system for 
lovastatin and simvastatin, and two competing policies introduced by the 
Andalusian Public Health Service (APHS) for all statins, first a maximum consumer 
price (MCP) and then a so called quality prescribing incentive for general 
practitioners (MCP plus PI). 
 
This study is designed as an observational, retrospective, interrupted time series 
analysis with comparison series (APHS and the rest of Spain) of 46 monthly drug 
use and sales ratios from January 2001 to October 2004 for each active ingredient 
in the group of statins. 
 
RP has been effective at reducing the volume of sales growth of the off-patent 
statins, yet its overall impact on sales of all statins has been relatively modest. The 
quantity and volume of sales impact heavily depends on regulatory RP details such 
as when the system is introduced, how often it is updated, and how the reference 
price is calculated.    
 
JEL classification: I18, H5. 
 






THE IMPACT OF GENERIC REFERENCE PRICING INTERVENTIONS IN 






Spain (43.2 million inhabitants) is the fifth largest market in Europe for 
pharmaceuticals. Public drug expenditures in Spain set an unprecedented trend in 
the 1990s and the first years of this century. Per capita public spending on 
prescription drugs, adjusted for general inflation, more than doubled from 1989 to 





2 system was effectively introduced into the Spanish National Public 
Health System (henceforth NPHS) in December 2000. This system is applied to off-
patent drugs with the same active ingredient (bio-equivalence). All the 
pharmaceutical products included in the same homogeneous group are bio-
equivalent (quality and reliability of products in the same group differ little, being 
nearly perfect substitutes), and at least one of them has to be a generic product. 
For each homogeneous set of products a reference price is calculated on the basis of 
the weighted average (year on year) of the lowest-priced products that account for 
at least 20% of the market sales
3. 
 
A notable change in this generic RP system was introduced in January 2004. Since 
then the RP has been calculated as the average of the three lowest costs per day of 
treatment for each form of administration of an active ingredient, according to its 
defined daily dose. If the prescription price exceeds the reference price and there 
are other generic products in the same “group”, the pharmacist has to dispense the 
lowest-priced generic in the same “group”. 
 
In September 2001 the Andalusian Public Health Service (henceforth APHS) (a 
regional subsystem with 7.7 million inhabitants insured) introduced a new 
pharmaceutical procurement mechanism based on a more “intensive” RP system, 
which competes with the RP system applied by the rest of the NPHS. In this regional 
RP system, product coverage is defined by all those active ingredients with more 
than two products on the market (originator or licensed brand names, copies or 
generics) which are being sold at different consumer prices. In the APHS the 
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reference price level is set at the level of the higher price of the two lowest-priced 
products for each active ingredient. The main limitation of this regional RP system is 
that it requires prescriptions to be made out using the name of the active ingredient 
and not the commercial name of the product (International Nonproprietary Name, 
INN). The pharmacies agreed with the regional government to dispense the lowest-
priced product for each active ingredient, independently of its generic status. In 
addition, economic incentives were introduced for physicians to prescribe using the 
non-commercial name of the active ingredient.  
 
We focused the study on HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (i.e., statins), which lessen 
the risk of coronary events. Since the introduction of statins into the market as 
effective lipid lowering agents in the early 1990s, they have become blockbusters in 
many developed countries. Statins accounted for 6.86% of prescription sales in 
Spain in 2004
4. Atorvastatin ranked as the first active ingredient in terms of sales 
volume (€344 million), and pravastatin as the sixth (€148 million).  
 
The doctor prescribing a statin first faces a choice among the alternative active 
ingredients in this therapeutic group, and then a choice among brands (the 
originator’s brand name, or those brands resulting from licensing agreements) and 
generics after patent expiration. However, which statin is prescribed clearly matters 
in terms of cost
5 (in the absence of solid evidence of differences in clinical 
benefits/outcomes). Table 1 presents a comparison of the average cost per defined 
daily dose (DDD) for whole tablets or capsules of statins dispensed in Spain in 
October 2004. For whole pills and most commonly used doses, simvastatin is the 
least costly. 
 
[ Insert Table 1 ] 
 
In this paper we look at six particular compounds (statins) sold primarily in oral 
dosage forms (atorvastatin, fluvastatin, lovastatin, pravastatin, simvastatin, and 
cerivastatin) which are close therapeutic substitutes, i.e., they can be prescribed for 
many of the same conditions, but with significant price differences (Table 1). Three 
of these drugs (lovastatin, simvastatin, and pravastatin) lost patent protection and 
experienced generic entry during or before the period in which we study them. 
Cerivastatin was withdrawn from the market in August 2001.  
 
During the study period the results of several important clinical trials were 
published which provided evidence of a notable improvement and extension of the 
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efficacy of statins in cholesterol management
6. These clinical trials had major 
implications for cholesterol management that resulted in an increase in the number 
of patients for whom statins may be considered clinically appropriate.      
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the intended and unintended impact on 
pharmaceutical use and volume of sales of three public financing reforms applied to 
the prescription of the six commercially available statins from January 2001 to 
October 2004: a Spanish generic (RP) system for lovastatin and simvastatin, and 
two competing policies introduced by the APHS for all statins, first a maximum 
consumer price (MCP) and then a so called quality prescribing incentive for general 
practitioners (MCP plus PI), similar to a generic prescribing incentive. 
 
Spain provides an excellent setting to study the impact of several gradual and 
competing generic reference pricing measures on public expenditure, in the context 
of a heavily regulated pharmaceutical market and a small generic share. The 
present study adds to and improves on the current body of literature evaluating 
reference pricing policies
8 by combining a conventional before-and-after time series 
design with the comparison between aggregated time series for the same time 
period, by taking into account other simultaneous supply and demand-side 
interventions, and also by estimating the impact of public financing measures on 
therapeutic substitutes.  
 
 




The data for this paper come initially from IMS Spain, a firm that does marketing 
research for the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
The data are in the form of a monthly time series from January 2001 to October 
2004 (46 monthly periods) of quantity and volume of sales valued at regulated ex-
factory prices (not including potential producer discounts to wholesale distribution 
firms or to pharmacies) at the level of each active ingredient for the six statins 
available in the Spanish market during that period, separated into Andalusia and 
the rest of Spain. An observation is equal to an active ingredient-month. Quantity is 
measured as the aggregated number of prescribed units for each active ingredient, 
which may differ in dosages. Thus, this variable only represents a proxy of 
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quantity, given that it does not allow us to calculate the quantity of the active 
ingredient or the number of defined daily doses (DDD), nor does it allow us to 
calculate meaningful average prices. Additional consumer price information was 
obtained from the centralized National Health System (NHS) pharmaceutical 





In this paper we chose to examine statins for several reasons. First, three out of 
the six compounds lost patent protection (lovastatin, simvastatin, and pravastatin), 
and experienced significant generic entry. Second, two of these three off-patent 
compounds, allowing a choice between brands and generics, were included under 
the NPHS reference pricing system, undergoing only one official revision of the 
reference price during the study period. This allows us to study the impact of 
reference pricing coverage and price revision on the active ingredients included 
under this system, and also to analyse the impact on close therapeutic substitutes 
not included under the RP system. Third, statins have been the subject of several 
regional procurement innovations by the APHS (a second RP system and economic 
incentives for primary physicians). This allows us to study the impact of these 
regional measures by means of time series.   
 
Potential out-of-pocket expenses implicit in the RP system may effectively 
disappear if all brand and generic statin producers with prices above the reference 
price immediately reduce them to the reference level after RP introduction, and if 
many patients have nearly free access to prescribed medicines (only a small 
fraction of the costs are borne directly by the patients). Notwithstanding, even 
though this is the case in Spain, the widespread price reduction observed in brand-
name products and some generics under RP (a change in the relative price between 
active ingredients under and not under the RP system) may affect the use and 
volume of sales of statins subject to RP (own price elasticity), and also that of those 
not subject to RP (cross-price elasticity). There will be a potential drop in the 
monetary value of the volume of sales of statins as a result of the general price 
reduction following RP introduction, but the overall volume of sales effect will also 
depend on the behaviour of the number of prescriptions of these medicines that are 
dispensed.  
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Pavcnik
7 observed that the overall quantity of product sold is, on average, 
unaffected by RP, that is, overall quantity is not sensitive to prices. In this paper, it 
is hypothesized that the effect of lower prices for products under RP may be 
amplified or compensated by an increase in the number of prescriptions (quantity). 
Lower prices for some statins following RP introduction may result in an increase in 
prescriptions in the wake of substantial price reduction, depending on the price 
sensitivity of patients and doctors. If the doctor, acting as a double agent for the 
patient and the public insurer, considers the opportunity costs of prescriptions 
under the new relative prices, then a reduction in the relative price of active 
ingredients under RP may result in an increase in the number of these 
prescriptions. From the demand-side perspective, this potential quantity increase 
may occur when physicians, better informed about prices after RP introduction and 
perceiving active ingredients in the group of statins as therapeutic substitutes (the 
RP system may contribute towards the “visibility” not only of intra-active ingredient 
price differences but also of inter-active ingredient price differences), tend to 
increase the frequency with which they prescribe lower-priced statins and/or switch 
to the lower-priced statin. An increase in the number of prescriptions of statins 
under the RP system may also occur when physicians tend to extend statin 
prescription, given substantially lower prices with RP, to patients who may receive 
only marginal benefits from statin consumption, and otherwise would not have 
received a statin prescription.  
 
From the supply perspective, two opposing potential trends may be hypothesized 
for the use of statins under RP. First, substantial brand-name price reductions will 
probably result in a reduction in commercial and promotional effort by brand 
producers among physicians, and a corresponding decline in sales. But, second, the 
increasing number of generic entrants may exert higher commercial pressure from 
generic firms on prescribing decisions.        
 
The number of prescriptions of statins not included in the RP system can also 
undergo changes as a result of the introduction of RP. This substitution effect on 
consumption of substitute therapies may reflect decisions taken by the patient, the 
prescriber and/or the influence exerted by the pharmaceutical industry on 
prescribing decisions. 
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The empirical model 
 
This section proposes an empirical approach to identify the effect of RP measures 
on quantity and volume of sales for statins. Outcome variables of interest are 
monthly volume of sales (in euros) and number of prescriptions dispensed per 
person for each of the six active ingredients in the therapeutic group of statins. 
Volume of sales and quantity are measured as monthly sales and quantity ratios 
between the per capita value in each period and the per capita value of the initial 
period. Outcome variables are observed before and after the public insurer 
interventions.  
 
The following specifications are used for each active ingredient: 
 
yit = β0 + β1time + Σβ2j adoptjit + Σβ3j postjit + Σβ4j postjit*timej + εit          (1) 
    
where yit is the outcome variable of interest for region i (Andalusia, and rest of 
Spain) at time t (t=0, 1, .....45); time is a secular trend before insurer 
interventions for each time period t, being 0 in the first period; adoptjt is a design 
variable that identifies the time period t when the insurance intervention j is 
adopted for the first time (adoptjit is 1 if intervention j is adopted in region i at time 
t, and 0 otherwise); postijt is a design variable indicating whether region i at period 
t is affected by insurer intervention j (postijt is an indicator that is 1 if the active 
ingredient at time t is covered by insurer intervention j  in region i , and 0 
otherwise); the interaction terms between postijt and timej denote changes in time 
trend after the implementation of intervention j; and εit  could represent a 
measurement error in the outcome variable or unobserved factors that affect it. 
 
In the absence of any uncontrolled factors or other interventions affecting the 
outcome variables in Equation (1), the intercept coefficient β0 represents the initial 
level of the outcome variable; the coefficient β1 on the time trend reflects the 
monthly trend change (linear slope) in the outcome variable; coefficients β2j on the 
first period of adoption of the insurance intervention j depict the one-time 
transitory level effect of the month of intervention activation; coefficients β3j on the 
indicator post of each insurer intervention j depict the impact of changes in insurer 
interventions on the initial level of the outcome variable; and coefficients β4j on the 
interaction terms between postj and timej depict the impact of insurer interventions 
on the monthly trend change of the outcome variable. Insurer interventions could 
thus be evaluated for one-time effect of the month of activation, permanent 
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changes in the trend change and/or instantaneous permanent changes in 
magnitude. Then, in Equation (1), β2,  β3, and β4 measure the public financing 
reform effects: i.e., one-time transitory change in the initial level, permanent initial 
level change, and baseline trend changes, respectively. 
 
The coefficient estimates in Equation (1) might be biased by intertemporal variation 
unrelated to insurer interventions, such as changes in technology, regulation, or 
demand. To avoid this, the paper compares outcome variables for statins in the 
APHS with outcome variables in the rest of the NPHS.   
 
Table 2 provides a detailed summary of nine supply-side or demand-side 
interventions observed in the Spanish statin market during the study period.  
 
For research purposes, interventions evaluated in the empirical model may be 
classified into three groups. First, three Spanish reference pricing interventions 
adopted by the NPHS: lovastatin under reference pricing (RP) in May 2002; 
simvastatin under reference pricing (RP) in January 2004; and a revision of the 
reference price for lovastatin in January 2004. Second, two regional procurement 
interventions adopted by the APHS: maximum consumer price (MCP) for all statins 
in September 2001; and MCP plus economic prescribing incentives (PI) for off-
patent statins in March 2003. And third, four other concomitant interventions 
occurred simultaneously during the study period which could also exert notable 
influence on outcome variables: cerivastatin withdrawal from the market in August 
2001; first generic entry for simvastatin in January 2002; entry of an extended 
release form (a line ex ension) of fluvastatin in October 2002; and first generic 
entry for pravastatin in January 2004. Thus, j interventions considered in the 




[ Insert Table 2 ] 
 
Regional random effects are added to Equation (1) in order to control for the time-
invariant region-specific characteristics. Anticipation effects for the months before 
the insurer intervention were also considered in the empirical specification of 
Equation (1). Equation (1) assumes linearity in the relation between the 
explanatory variables and the outcome variables, but after empirically testing non-
linear patterns, linearity was maintained in the preferred model. Seasonal 
fluctuations were controlled by including a term for August in the regression model. 
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This framework identifies the effect of insurer interventions in the statin market on 
average use and volume of sales for each active ingredient by combining a 
conventional before-and-after time series design, and also by taking into detailed 
consideration other simultaneous supply and demand-side interventions.  
 
The design of this study is an observational, retrospective, interrupted time series 
analysis with comparison series of 46 monthly drug use and volume of sales ratios 
from January 2001 to October 2004. These types of studies represent the strongest 
quasi-experimental designs for estimating intervention effects in non-randomized 
settings
9, 10. It should be noted that in a recent review of the research design of 
studies evaluating pharmaceutical policy outcomes of administrative interventions, 
only two papers out of 18 in the literature were found to use time series with 
appropriate comparison series, and only one with a before-and-after design 
including a comparison group
8.  
 
As time is an explanatory variable in the regression analysis of Equation (1), error 
terms of consecutive observations are probably correlated. For each active 
ingredient, Equation (1) is estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) and the 
Prais-Winsten method was used to correct for serial correlation
10. Robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at a regional level were estimated. These standard 
errors are robust to the presence of general forms of heteroskedasticity and they 
also take into account general forms of serial correlation within each active 
ingredient over time. The Durbin-Watson statistic was used as a test for serial 
autocorrelation of the error terms in the regression model. Equation (1) was 
estimated using the linear and log-linear empirical specification.  
 
Prediction models were constructed in order to obtain a measure of savings that 
might result from insurer intervention analysed in this paper after policies were 
enacted. Potential savings were estimated by comparing volume of sales patterns 
before implementation of the reform and after it, according to the empirical 
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Figure 1 plots the price of brand-name, first generic and lowest-priced generic 
products for the most frequently dispensed presentations of lovastatin and 
simvastatin from January 2001 until October 2004. Descriptive data on consumer 
price trends confirm previous price trends observed for other active ingredients in 
Spain
3. First, brand-name lovastatin and simvastatin and their generic substitutes, 
with a price higher than the centralized reference price, immediately reduced their 
price to the reference level when RP was introduced. The introduction of the RP 
system tends to decrease the price of the original relative to the price of generics, 
as observed in other countries
12.  
 
Second, the price of new generic entrants for lovastatin and simvastatin in the 
period after RP introduction was in all cases lower than the lowest preceding price, 
usually corresponding to the lowest-priced generic in each period of time.  
 
And third, the price of all products already on the market before the introduction of 
RP with a price equal to or lower than the reference level remained absolutely 
constant during the period after, and did not experience any consumer price 
competition effect because of RP or because of the lower price of new generic 
entrants. At the same time, the data suggest that RP has not been effective in 
reducing the consumer price of products with a price initially below the reference 
level. Zweifel and Crivelli
12 also observed that RP had little impact on generic prices 
which were already below the reimbursement ceiling. The number of generics firms 
in the market does not affect the prices of brands or generics in the market when 
their previous price was not above the reference level. That is, price decline for 
brand-name and generic products is not clearly explained by variation in their 
exposure to competition: it only depends on arbitrary regulatory decisions as to the 
period for which the product is covered by the RP system and the moment at which 
the reference price is revised. 
 
[ Insert Figure 1 ] 
 
In January 2001, average volume of sales valued at regulated ex-factory prices per 
1000 inhabitants was €696.9 in the rest of Spain and 20.7% lower in the APHS 
(€552.7). Per capita volume of sales in the initial period was lower in the APHS for 
all active ingredients. At the end of the study period, October 2004, monthly 
volume of sales per capita was significantly higher than at the beginning (€943.9 in 
the rest of the Spanish Health System, and €772.8 in the APHS), but the average 
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difference between the two regions had narrowed slightly (18.1%). Trends in per 
capita volume of sales for each active ingredient in the APHS and in the rest of the 
Spanish Health System are depicted in Figure 2.   
 
[ Insert Table 3 ] 
 
[ Insert Figure 2 ] 
 
Quantity and volume of sales ratios for each active ingredient in Table 3 show that 
the highest increase for volume of sales and number of prescriptions per 1000 
inhabitants was observed for the two on-patent statins, fluvastatin and 
atorvastatin. For fluvastatin, volume of sales per capita was 4.8 times greater in 
October 2004 than in January 2001 in the rest of Spain, and 5.8 times in the APHS 
(number of prescriptions per capita were 3.1 and 3.8 times greater respectively). 
For atorvastatin, volume of sales experienced a 139.3% increase in the rest of 
Spain during the period, and a 155% increase in the APHS. Volume of sales ratio 
trends for each active ingredient are also depicted in Figure 3. 
 
[ Insert Figure 3 ] 
 
At the other extreme, the highest volume of sales decline was observed for 
lovastatin and simvastatin, both off patent at the end of the period. Lovastatin, the 
first statin to reach patent expiration, underwent a pronounced decline in volume of 
sales (48.6% in the rest of Spain, and 58.4% in the APHS), but also in the number 
of prescriptions (6.5% in the rest of Spain, and 24.3% in the APHS). Simvastatin, 
the lowest cost statin per DDD, experienced an increase in quantity (86.4% in the 
rest of Spain, and 21.5% in the APHS) that was partially offset by price reductions, 
resulting in a 25.3% volume of sales decline in the rest of Spain and a 52.7% 
decline in the APHS.   
 
For statins as a whole, volume of sales increased during this period by 35.4% in the 
rest of Spain, and a fairly similar rate in the APHS (39.8%). Notwithstanding, 
pattern trends in quantity and volume of sales ratios during this period present 
significant differences between the two regions. Compared with the rest of Spain, in 
the APHS higher growth rates for quantities and volume of sales were observed for 
both on-patent statins (fluvastatin and atorvastatin), and also for pravastatin. On 
the other hand, the APHS also showed a steeper decline or more moderate increase 
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for off-patent and lower-priced statins, resulting in a clearly more pronounced 
volume of sales reduction for lovastatin and simvastatin.  
 
 
Pre-reform series trends 
 
Results of the estimation of Equation (1) for quantity and volume of sales ratios are 
presented in Tables 4 and 5. Residuals are assumed to be normally distributed, we 
corrected for heterogeneity, and the Durbin-Watson statistic values indicate no 
serious autocorrelation. No statistically significant anticipatory effects were 
detected. The linear model, rather than the log-linear model, was the one that best 
fit with the data during the study period.  
 
[ Insert Tables 4 and 5 ] 
 
Pre-reform series trends indicate that the initial level of the outcome variables 
(quantity and volume of sales ratios) were, as expected by the definition of these 
variables, not significantly different from one, being slightly higher in the APHS for 
lovastatin in comparison with the rest of Spain.  
 
The baseline time trend for volume of sales ratio, equivalent to the average 
monthly trend change in the absence of reforms, was positive for all active 
ingredients, being higher for on-patent statins and very low for the first off-patent 
statin: fluvastatin (4.1%; 95% CI 2.8 to 5.5), atorvastatin (3.4%; 95% CI 1.1 to 
5.7), pravastatin (0.6%, 95% CI 0.5 to 2.4), simvastatin (1.4%; 95% CI 1.3 to 
1.5), and lovastatin (0.1%; 95% CI –0.8 to 1.1). Similar trends were observed for 
quantity ratios. The rise in the baseline trend of pravastatin for volume of sales 
ratio in the APHS compared to the rest of Spain was slight but statistically 
significant, indicating a higher monthly trend increase in the volume of sales for this 
active ingredient.  
 
 
Impact of the general Spanish RP system 
 
The results shown in Table 5 reveal that generic entry for lovastatin, simvastatin 
and pravastatin did not lead to any statistically significant volume of sales (euros) 
reduction before RP. That is, despite the observed lower prices of many new 
generic entrants before RP, lower prices did not produce the expected savings, the 
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number of prescriptions also being unaffected by generic entry. In this respect, the 
pre-intervention Spanish statin market was perfectly inelastic or insensitive to 
potential consumer price reductions. For example, after January 2004 pravastatin 
volume of sales trends remained unchanged despite the fact that up to October 
seven generic firms had entered the market and that the price of the lowest-priced 
generic was equivalent to only 75.3% that of the brand-name product.  
 
The impact of including lovastatin under the RP system in May 2002 was a 
permanent reduction in the previous monthly trend change of 0.76% (95% CI –
1.4% to –0.2%) for the volume of sales in the rest of Spain, this reduction being 
h i g h e r  f o r  t h e  A P H S  ( - 1 . 2 % ,  9 5 %  C I  - 1 . 8  t o  - 0 . 6 0 ) .  H o w e v e r ,  v o l u m e  o f  s a l e s  
reduction cannot be attributed solely to price reduction forced by the RP system, 
but also to a quantity reduction after the introduction of RP. In the case of the 
statin whose patent first expired, lovastatin, RP coverage and price decline was also 
accompanied by a negative quantity effect that reinforced the volume of sales 
reduction. The monthly trend change of quantity ratio after RP introduction declined 
by 0.6% in the rest of Spain (95% CI –1.5 to 0.0) and by 1% in the APHS (95% CI 
–1.9 to –0.4). All the additional volume of sales reduction observed in the APHS 
corresponds to an additional regional negative quantity effect. The quantity 
reduction of the lowest-priced statin in May 2002 observed in this case, as a 
response to RP coverage, may indicate a potential transfer of prescriptions to 
statins not under RP, which, however, was not detected in the models presented in 
Table 4. As a related effect of including lovastatin under RP, pravastatin 
experienced a one-time increase of 2.4% (95% CI 0.7 to 4.0) in its volume of sales 
level in the rest of Spain. 
 
The revision of the reference price of lovastatin in January 2004 resulted in a 
permanent decrease in the initial volume of sales level of 12.3% (95% CI –17.5 to 
–7.1), without any statistically significant effect on the number of prescriptions as 
was observed when lovastatin was included under RP for the first time.  
 
Although the first generic entry for simvastatin occurred in January 2002, it was not 
covered by the RP system until two years later. The monthly trend change for 
volume of sales of simvastatin decreased nearly 2% (95% CI –2.0 to –1.9) after RP 
introduction. In contrast with the decline in quantity of lovastatin after RP was 
introduced, simvastatin showed a permanent increase in the monthly trend increase 
in the number of prescriptions equivalent to 0.2% after RP introduction (95% CI –
0.0 to –0.5). The inclusion of simvastatin under RP, and its corresponding price 
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decline, produced a negative cross-effect on the monthly trend for quantity and 
volume of sales of atorvastatin in the rest of Spain, but not in the APHS, where the 
monthly trend for atorvastatin actually increased. Neither the volume of sales 
impact nor the quantity impact of simvastatin inclusion under RP was observed in 
the APHS, probably due to the impact of prior Andalusian reforms that affected this 
active ingredient.     
 
Prediction models were constructed in order to estimate cost savings achieved after 
RP introduction and reference price revision. Volume of sales before implementation 
of the RP interventions were extrapolated for 12 months, when data permitted, 
using the estimated linear model to estimate savings accrued by consumers and 
the public insurer (or losses incurred by pharmaceutical firms).  
 
In the rest of Spain, the mean monthly savings for the 12 months after intervention 
attributed to the initial application of RP to lovastatin (May 2002 to April 2003) was 
16.7% of total lovastatin sales (95% CI –20.4 to –13.0), representing 1.1% (95% 
CI –1.3 to –0.9) of the total volume of sales of statins. In the APHS, savings 
attributed to this intervention in the 12 months post RP introduction were higher 
t h a n  i n  t h e  r e s t  o f  S p a i n ,  b e i n g  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  2 3 . 7 %  o f  t h e  v o l u m e  o f  s a l e s  o f  
lovastatin (95% CI -29.0 to –18.3), but equivalent to only 1.3% of total statin sales 
(95% CI –1.0 to –0.4). 
 
In the rest of Spain, the mean monthly savings for the 10 months after intervention 
attributed to the reference price revision applied to lovastatin (January 2004 to 
October 2004) was 16.3% of total lovastatin sales (95% CI –23.4 to –9.1), but a 
mere 0.7% (95% CI –1.0 to –0.4) of the total volume of sales of statins. These 
figures represent the impact of reference price revision in addition to the previous 
inclusion of this active ingredient under RP. In the APHS, the additional impact of 
reference price revision was equivalent to an 11.5% (95% CI –19.5 to –3.5) 
reduction in the volume of sales of lovastatin for the 10 months after intervention, 
yet a reduction of only 0.3% (95% CI –0.6 to –0.1) in total statin sales. 
 
In the rest of Spain, the mean monthly savings for the 10 months after RP first 
being applied to simvastatin (January 2004 to October 2004) was 51.8% of total 
simvastatin sales (95% CI –54.6 to –48.9), and a notable 13.9% (95% CI –14.7 to 
–13.0) of the total volume of sales of statins. Taking into consideration regional 
random effects and the regional interventions previously adopted in the APHS, the 
impact of simvastatin under RP was notably more modest than in the rest of Spain: 
           Page 14 of 31  
a reduction of 29.7% (95% CI –32.6 to –26.8) in simvastatin sales in the APHS, 
and a 3.9% reduction (95% CI –4.1 to –3.6) of the total volume of sales of statins. 
 
 
Impact of the Andalusian reforms 
 
The introduction in September 2001 of maximum consumer prices (MCP) for all 
statins in the APHS, complemented by an economic incentive for physicians to 
prescribe using the non-commercial name in order to allow lower-priced equivalent 
dispensing substitution, did not contribute, contrary to policy objectives, to reduce 
the volume of sales of statins. Despite the inclusion of regional fixed effects for the 
APHS in the model, the impact of this measure was a notable increase in the 
monthly sales ratio trend of atorvastatin (2.3%; 95% CI 0.8 to 3.7).  
 
The mean monthly change for the 12 months after intervention attributed to MCP 
(September 2001 to August 2002) was an unexpected 21.4% (95% CI –23.7 to –
19.0) increase in volume of sales for total statins in the APHS, as a result of 
quantity increases of atorvastatin. This sales increase was equivalent to an 8.1% 
increase (95% CI –9.2 to 7.1) in total statin sales. 
  
Early in 2003, the APHS added to the economic incentive system an indicator 
considering the proportion of off-patent statin prescriptions (MCP plus PI). This 
intervention resulted in a reduction in quantity (3.2%; 95% CI –5.6 to –0.8) and 
volume of sales (3.7%; 95% CI –6.7 to –0.8) in the monthly trend change for 
atorvastatin, one of the two on-patent statins. However, the main unintended 
impact of this intervention was a decline in the initial level and the monthly trend in 
the volume of sales (5.6%; 95% CI –7.8 to –3.5) and the quantity ratio (3.5%; 
95% CI –3.8 to –3.2) of simvastatin, which was precisely the lowest-priced statin 
at the end of the period, and one that contributed positively to the economic 
incentive.    
 
The mean monthly savings for the 12 months after intervention attributed to MCP 
plus PI was a slight decrease of –3.0% (95% CI –6.5 to 0.5) in volume of sales for 
total statins in the APHS, with a notable reduction of 35.4% (95% CI –44.6 to 26.2) 
in simvastatin sales, accompanied by an increase of 16.6% (95% CI 10.6 to 21.3) 
in the volume of sales of atorvastatin, being the main factors in this change. 
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Impact of cerivastatin withdrawal 
 
Cerivastatin withdrawal occurred in August 2001 as a result of internationally 
reported safety problems. This withdrawal produced a temporary increase in the 
following trimester in the number of prescriptions of pravastatin.  
 
 
Impact of a supply-side policy 
 
Probably the most successful intervention in the statin market during the study 
period was a supply-side policy, the introduction of an extended release innovative 
form for fluvastatin. The introduction of new forms of active ingredients still under 
patent protection is often used in the pharmaceutical market by originators as a 
way to effectively reduce the impact of future generic competition.  
 
This supply-side measure allowed a major permanent increase of 68% in the initial 
number of prescriptions, and also an additional increase of 5% (95% CI 4.2 to 5.8) 
in the monthly volume of sales trend. The magnitude of the volume of sales impact 
of this measure was greater than the effects produced by any of the public 
financing reforms analysed in this paper.   
 
I n  t h e  r e s t  o f  S p a i n ,  t h e  m e a n  m o n t h l y  i n c r e a s e  i n  v o l u m e  o f  s a l e s  f o r  t h e  1 2  
months after the market entry of an extended release form of fluvastatin (October 
2002 to September 2003) was 70.2% of the total volume of sales of fluvastatin 
(95% CI 61.3 to 79.1), and 2.2% (95% CI 2.1 to 2.4) of total statin sales. In the 
APHS, the impact of this measure was equivalent to 52.4% of total fluvastatin sales 




Overall impact of the interventions 
 
Over the 46 months of the study period, all the progressively introduced public 
financing interventions reported in Table 2 resulted in a 2.2% (95% CI –3.8 to –
0.6) average monthly decrease in the volume of sales of statins in the rest of 
Spain.  
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The year 2004 was the only year in which the accumulated impact of the 
interventions was an average monthly decrease of 12.2% in the volume of sales 
(95% CI –12.9 to –11.5), as a direct result of the inclusion of simvastatin under RP 
and the revision of the reference price of lovastatin, which appears as the only 
intervention with a significant impact on the volume of sales in the rest of Spain. 
 
In the APHS, the aggregated effect of all the interventions considered during the 
overall study period was a change in the monthly volume of sales that was non-
significantly different from zero. However, as was observed in the rest of Spain, in 
2004 the accumulated effect of all interventions in this market resulted in a 15.3% 
average decrease in the monthly volume of sales (95% CI –18.3 to –12.3), which 





The results of the impact evaluation model presented in this paper lead to the 
following basic conclusions for the statin market in Spain during the study period.  
 
First, in a heavily regulated market such as the Spanish one, the decline in the 
consumer price of brand-name and generic off-patent products was not associated 
with potential competition from lower-priced new entrants, but to the arbitrary 
regulatory decisions as to the period for which the product is covered by RP or the 
moment at which its reference price is revised.  
 
Second, the results confirm that prices of off-patent brand-name drugs and 
generics with a price higher than the reference price tend to drop to this level 
immediately when RP is introduced, but RP was not effective in reducing the price 
of products initially below the reference level.  
 
Third, RP coverage of the first off-patent statin, lovastatin, was the only 
intervention that was observed to be effective in reducing its volume of sales 
growth, despite previous entry of lower-priced generics, while the impact of the 
delayed revision of its reference price was of similar importance. This indicates that 
the period of time (number of generic firms in the market in that period) in which 
the reference price is fixed, when it is updated, and the method of calculation of the 
reference price are key determinants of the impact of RP on the volume of sales.  
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Fourth, including simvastatin under RP two years after the entry of generics, when 
more than 20 generic firms had entered the market, resulted in a delayed but 
substantial price reduction and therefore a substantial decrease in the volume of 
sales equivalent to a reduction of nearly 14% in overall statins sales in the ten 
months after RP introduction in Spain.  
 
Fifth, dispensed quantities of statins are not inelastic to price variations: price 
reductions of lovastatin were accompanied by a reduction in the number of 
prescriptions of this first off-patent statin, although the other statins maintained 
their time trend growth as observed before RP; in contrast, price reduction of 
simvastatin was accompanied by a slight increase in its growth rate, and also a 
slight decrease in the number of prescriptions of atorvastatin, the top-selling on-
patent statin.      
 
Sixth, the regional public financing reforms adopted in the APHS only resulted in a 
slight volume of sales decrease in the case of simvastatin and atorvastatin. 
 
And seventh, the intervention occurring in the study period that had the greatest 
impact on the volume of sales was the marketing of an extended release form of 
fluvastatin, a still on-patent statin.    
 
This study presents several limitations that merit consideration. First, public 
expenditure data on dispensed statins are proxied in this paper by overall volume 
of sales, including publicly financed but also out-of-pocket sales, valued at 
regulated ex-factory prices. Several potential problems could arise from this data 
set, in view of the purpose of this paper. In order to evaluate public financing 
reforms, public procurement data should be used. However, in the Spanish market, 
most dispensed prescription drugs are publicly financed, out-of-pocket prescription 
sales representing a very small market share. Furthermore, the public financing 
reforms established the reimbursement limits at the level of the consumer price, 
therefore volume of sales valued at consumer prices would be more appropriate for 
evaluating the impact of these reforms. Notwithstanding, in this case price 
regulation establishes consumer prices by adding proportional distribution margins 
to the regulated ex-factory price, so this ex-factory price presents a perfect 
correlation with consumer prices. And lastly, the quantity data do not allow the 
calculation of defined daily doses, which would have provided a more precise 
quantity measure than is possible by simply using the number of prescriptions. 
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Second, a key feature of the method employed in this paper is that the difference 
between the observed value for the outcome variable in the period before the 
intervention and the value that would have been obtained in the absence of the 
intervention in the after period is null. However, when controlled prospective 
randomized trials are not possible, the quasi-experimental techniques used in this 
paper are a recommended method of assessing intervention impacts
9, 10.  
 
Third, the impact of the interventions under evaluation on other health services and 
on health status is not considered in this paper. Despite its importance, this paper 
restricts its attention to quantity and volume of sales changes attributed to public 
financing reforms in the statin market, as all these interventions involve 
pharmaceutical treatment substitution for patients using the same bio-equivalent 
active ingredient, and therefore the impact on other health services and health 
status is expected to be very low. 
 
A fourth limitation inherent to all policy evaluations applied to a class of drugs is 
that results cannot be easily generalized to all drug categories or to other health 
systems or pharmaceutical markets. 
 
Despite some data and method limitations, the results of this paper can be 
regarded as important for a number of reasons, at least relative to the case under 
analysis but also for the design of similar interventions in the pharmaceutical 
market. The observed persistent expenditure inelasticity to potential price 
competition even after RP introduction is probably the result of the widespread 
absence of cost-consciousness and proper efficiency incentives for the patient and 
the prescriber. Incentives on the patient and prescriber side remained nearly 
unchanged during the study period, at least in the rest of Spain; notwithstanding, 
their price inelasticity was substituted by potential co-payments under RP, which 
were effective at changing the pricing behaviour of producers. However, the 
sensitivity of pricing decisions to potential co-payments has not been able to take 
advantage of decentralized market decisions after patent expiry, but instead has 
been associated with a highly demanding and detailed regulation through RP, which 
may have intended but also unintended consequences on market performance. As 
an example, it would be of great interest, although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper, to know whether the RP system resulted in a clustering of prices of new 
generic entrants around the reference price with little variation, or whether RP 
resulted in a smaller generic market share than would have been expected without 
RP. 
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The question that still remains to be answered is to what extent long-term welfare 
effects of other alternative interventions more directed towards introducing cost 
incentives for patient and prescriber behaviour (e.g., generic substitution by the 
cheapest equivalent, differential co-payments for lower-priced cost-effective 
products in order to make patients more cost-conscious, transferring financial 
responsibility of prescription drugs to physicians, etc.) could have been more 
effective to curb the rise in drug spending and achieve a more cost-effective use of 
drugs than the short-term regulatory interventions under evaluation. Even when 
the evaluation is restricted to quantity and expenditure impact, it is important to 
note that the results obtained in this paper are only indicative of the impact of the 
interventions on quantity and volume of sales ratios compared with the status quo 
or simply compared to doing nothing different from before the interventions (used 
as a counterfactual).    
 
The magnitude of the impact of interventions on quantity and volume of sales ratios 
is highly dependent on RP regulatory details. The RP systems employed by each 
insurer greatly differ in details and scope. In fact, we should think of RP as a family 
of many different pharmaceutical insurance coverage policies. In the case analysed 
in this paper, the impact of RP interventions on price and volume of sales ratios 
was dependent on the moment at which RP was introduced as of the first generic 
entry (and the number of entrants at that time), the reference price calculation 
method and the updating frequency. Arbitrary regulatory decisions in the Spanish 
statin market led lovastatin to come under RP 17 months later than the introduction 
of RP (with 12 generic products in the market). The reference price of lovastatin 
was maintained 34% higher than the lowest-priced generic until its price revision 
20 months after being covered by RP. And, after lovastatin price revision, in 
October 2004 the reference price was maintained 27% higher than the lowest-
priced generic with significant sales in the market. In the same way, simvastatin 
was included under the centralized RP scheme only after 23 generic firms had 
effectively entered the market, and with a reference price that in October 2004 still 
remained 36% higher than the lowest-priced generic. The comparison between a 
policy of generic substitution by the cheapest equivalent, with free generic pricing, 
and the centralized Spanish RP system would probably provide an approximation to 
the distance between a genuine cost-minimization perspective and the present RP 
system.      
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The results of this paper show that the market demand for a given drug (i.e., the 
combined demand for the original drug and its generic substitutes) is not perfectly 
inelastic in relation to its own price change induced by RP. Pavcnik
7 observed that 
for oral antidiabetics and antiulcerants in Germany, the quantity of products sold 
was unaffected after RP introduction. However, in this paper it has been observed 
that when the first off-patent statin, lovastatin, was covered by RP, the quantity 
ratio after RP introduction was lower than before RP. Then, the 0.76% monthly 
decline in lovastatin volume of sales is not only a proxy of expenditure savings for 
the public insurer, but also a proxy of a transfer of consumption to other higher-
priced therapeutic alternatives, especially when the other active ingredients in this 
group maintained the higher monthly trend increases in the number of 
prescriptions. Market behaviour was different, at least in the rest of Spain, when 
simvastatin, the second off-patent statin, was covered by the RP system. In this 
case, pharmaceutical management by regions in the rest of Spain was probably 
able to control the quantity reduction of this active ingredient, contrary to the 
market reaction to lovastatin price reduction, and the observed outcome was not 
only a quantity increase in simvastatin but also a quantity decline in atorvastatin, a 
higher-price and top-selling statin. Depending on the degree to which clinical 
decision makers believe that different active ingredients in the group of statins are 
close substitutes in a therapeutic sense, these results could point to possible scope 
for RP equivalence criteria reforms.  
 
Furthermore, the unexpected results obtained for the regional public financing 
reforms adopted in the APHS serve to underline the need for close attention to 
intervention design and details by policy-makers. First, the only significant 
reduction in volume of sales attributed to the regional reforms was observed for 
simvastatin, probably as a result of applying a reference price as of the entry of the 
first generics and not waiting until the arbitrarily delayed coverage of simvastatin 
under the centralized RP system. Second, the introduction of a physician incentive 
to prescribe statins without using the commercial name cannot be automatically 
expected to generate cost-effective behaviour: in fact, the regional public insurer 
could be fostering statin prescription generally, independently of price and patent 
status. And third, according to the results of this paper, the physician incentive to 
increase the proportion of off-patent prescribed statins has not been enough to 
counteract industry pressure in favour of on-patent statin prescriptions.     
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Table 1: Average cost per defined daily dose (DDD) for originator brand-name and 
lowest-priced generic statins dispensed in Spain  
 
Generic (brand name) Dose  (28 
tablets) 
DDD cost for 
brand name, 
€* 
DDD cost for 
lowest-priced 
generic* 
10mg 1.05  - 
20mg 0.89  - 
40mg 0.54  - 
Atorvastatin (Cardyl, Zarator) 
80mg 0.26  - 
20mg 1.18  - 
40mg 0.86  - 
Fluvastatin (Lescol) 
80mg 0.68  - 
20mg 0.57  0.45  Lovastatin (Mevacor) 
40mg 0.57  0.43 
10mg 1.77  1.28 
20mg 1.22  0.91 
Pravastatin (Lipemol) 
40mg 1.09  0.82 
10mg 0.39  0.32 
20mg 0.39  0.29 
Simvastatin (Zocor) 
40mg 0.39  0.20 
* Average cost per whole tablet or capsule in October 2004. Source: Spanish Ministry of 
Health and Consumer Affairs database and author’s calculations.  
 






Table 2: Main demand-side and supply-side interventions in the Spanish statin 
market during the study period 
 
Month/Year Intervention 
September 2001  Maximum consumer price (MCP) potentially for all statins in the 
APHS 
August 2001  Cerivastatin withdrawal from the market 
January 2002  First generic entry for simvastatin 
May 2002  Lovastatin under reference pricing (RP) 
October 2002  Entry of an extended release form of fluvastatin 
January 2003  MCP plus economic prescribing incentives (MCP plus PI) for off-
patent statins in the APHS 
January 2004  Simvastatin under reference pricing (RP) 
January 2004  Substantial decrease in lovastatin reference price (RP) 
January 2004  First generic entry for pravastatin 
 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics for volume of sales and quantity ratios 
 
Volume of sales ratio
a Quantity  ratio
a  Active 
ingredient  Andalusia  Rest of Spain  Andalusia  Rest of Spain 
Atorvastatin  1.972 1.865 2.550 2.393 
Fluvastatin  3.814 3.061 5.782 4.762 
Lovastatin 0.757 0.935 0.416 0.514 
Pravastatin  1.687 1.569 1.734 1.615 
Simvastatin  1.215 1.864 0.473 0.747 
All  statins  1.395 1.489 1.398 1.354 
a.  Ratio between average per capita volume of sales or quantity (number of prescriptions) in 
October 2004 in relation to average per capita values in January 2001. 
 





Table 4: Parameters estimated for quantity ratio models 
   
Coefficients      ATORVASTATIN  LOVASTATIN FLUVASTATIN  PRAVASTATIN   SIMVASTATIN
Initial level (intercept)  
APHS initial level 
Baseline trend 











































Centralized reference pricing system 
Trend change after lovastatin RP 
Trend change after lovastatin RP in the APHS 
Level change for only one period after lovastatin RP revision 
Level change for only one period after simvastatin RP 
Trend change after simvastatin RP 












































Trend change after MCP 
Level change after MCP plus PI 






























Level change after cerivastatin withdrawal (one trimester) 





































Table 5: Parameters estimated for volume of sales ratio models 
 
Coefficients      ATORVASTATIN  LOVASTATIN FLUVASTATIN  PRAVASTATIN   SIMVASTATIN
Initial level (intercept)  
APHS initial level 
Baseline trend 












































Centralized reference pricing system 
Level change after lovastatin RP 
Trend change after lovastatin RP 
Trend change after lovastatin RP in the APHS 
Level change for only one period after lovastatin RP revision 
Level change after lovastatin RP revision 
Level change after lovastatin RP revision in the APHS 
Trend change after simvastatin RP 


























































Trend change after MCP 
Level change after MCP plus PI 




























Level change after cerivastatin withdrawal (one trimester) 
































b.  P-value<0.01; b. P-value<0.05; c. P-value<0.10 
 
           Page 28 of 31 Figure 1: Price of brands and generics, and number of generic firms from January 
2001 to October 2004 
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